Risk assessment for commercial loans

Introduction The twelve member- countries that make up the European Union (EU) formed in the year 2002 have for a long time now been using the euro as their common currency.Advertising We will write a custom term paper sample on Risk assessment for commercial loans specifically for you for only $16.05 $11/page Learn More The use of this currency was implemented at Maastricht with an aim of strengthening the European Union as a key player in the world economy as well as to decrease the distortions and uncertainties that have been attached to the many currencies that have been used in the market1. The 1997 adoption of the euro zone took place with an aim of ensuring that budgetary discipline was maintained within the EU. Germany was during this time the greatest influence towards the implementation of the agreement (Williamson, 600). As a way of ensuring that the European Monetary Union (EMU) effectively performed its role, the 12 member countries came to an agreement referred to as the rule or the special international institution also referred to as the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The role of this rule was to enhance as well as ensure that there was economic homogeneity among all country members of the EMU before they introduced the use of the Euro as a common currency as well as internal stabilization of the Euro zone2. The use of the Euro by the member states was a way of agreeing that all money spent and borrowed is kept under control as a way of enhancing the stabilization. By maintaining budget discipline among the member countries, the pact seeks to ensure that it prevents excessive deficits and debts thus promoting monetary stability. Here, economic policies within the member countries are coordinated at the European level. The pact has more often been discussed during the past as well as the current times with debates ranging on whether it has been a success or not. Some countries such as Germany, France and Portugal h ave continuously been found to fall short of the criteria set by this pact and have instead used their strong political power over other countries to reduce the strength of the pact.Advertising Looking for term paper on business economics? Let's see if we can help you! Get your first paper with 15% OFF Learn More It is the poor and unequal performance of the Euro among these member states led to the reformation of the SGP in 2005 as a way of seeking more flexibilities within these states3. This paper explores on the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact with focus being on its various functions and importance to the members of the European Union as well as to the global economy. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) of the European Union (EU) History The history of the European Union dates back to the early years of 1969 when governments and presidents made a decision to create a monetary and economic union and make it an official European integration goal4. T his was followed by the Werner Plan of 1970 which saw to the proposition to have coordination of the economic policy among the six member states as well as the development of a system where there were fixed parties and use of one common currency. This plan was however hindered by the collapse of the Bretton-Woods-System which was a system, functional between 1945 and 1971, where foreign exchange rates all around the globe were fixed5. After a number of years of with unpredictable floating rates, the European Community (EC), with an exception of the United Kingdom, came to an agreement to form the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979. The implementation of this system was to allow for moderate floating rates for all its currencies. Though revaluations could be done on the bilateral -rates, the allowed flow of currencies was only within a 2.25% band on either side. Failure to obey this regulation would call for the intervention of the central banks.Advertising We will write a c ustom term paper sample on Risk assessment for commercial loans specifically for you for only $16.05 $11/page Learn More This system incorporated the use of currencies in the years that followed up to 1992 when it broke down as a result of critics and propaganda against a number of currencies that included the Swedish crone, Sterling Pound and the Italian Lira. Despite its reformation, this system did not come to gain its former value gain with a number of the currencies leaving the system while others expanded their bands to 15% hence not much could be fixed. Prior to the downfall of this system, a number of stern actions towards monetary integration were embarked on. After the 1988-1989 Delor Report, complete capital movement liberalization was attained in 1990. 1992 saw to the creation of a treaty through which the European Community through which a number of achievements were made. These achievements included the establishment of a common market, incorpo ration of modern aspects of political and economical integration to the treaty system as well as the establishment of the European Union (Hule, 32). The Maastricht agreement of 1992 defined 3 monetary integration stages6. Stage one ran between 1990 and 1994 and had various technical necessities that included central bank legislation and capital movements. Stage two which ran between 1994 and 1999 aimed at strengthening economic- policy convergence between state members as well as the establishment of the European Monetary that would act as a monitoring body. Stage three was to ensure that eligibility criteria be identified. The pact It became very distinct and clear in the 1990’s that the Maastricht treaty’s criteria and regulations were not a guarantee to a transitioned without hiccups on the common currency factor7.Advertising Looking for term paper on business economics? Let's see if we can help you! Get your first paper with 15% OFF Learn More The 1997 Amsterdam treaty had a political pact which was linked to the convergence criteria which was erstwhile agreed upon in Maastricht with four legal documents in its roots; article 99 and article 104 of the Maastricht treaty, June 17th general council resolution, and July 7th regulation 1466 and 1467 of the council8. The stability and growth pact is made up of three main elements; political adherence by all parties, preventive elements and dissuasive elements. Preventive elements are convergence programs that ensure monetary convergence in the European community which is to be reported by all members to the commission. The dissuasive elements are mainly the excessive budget deficit procedure. Of most importance to the pact are the obligations which are to be met by the members, the council and the commission but not the convergence criteria. Member countries have a commitment to a balanced budget or a certain medium run surplus and they ensure all the required goals are met to make this a reality. One function of the commission is reporting of the excessive budgets to the members as a criterion of early warning and facilitation of strictness, timeliness and effectiveness in the functioning of the pact. The commission is the core guardian which monitors the main body of the stability and growth pact. It carries out coordination matters whilst decision making is left to the council in order to make the body run smoothly. The council also has the critical function of enhancing timely and rigorous implementations of the pact elements if there happens to be violations in the convergence criteria9. The Convergence Criteria In addition to the self-commitment of all significant players in EMU, the accord on certain criteria of convergence is very crucial for the SGP10. These criteria approved on in 1992 and yet again in 1997, and functional from 1997 on for likely and authentic members, are as follows; Price stability: inflation should be less than 1.5 per cent greater than in the three countries’ most price stable. Interest rates Convergence: the long term interest rates has to be less than 2% higher than in the 3 countries most price stable. Exchange rate stability: the exchange rate’s is not permissible to lead the groups of the  EMS (in fact 15 per cent whichever side) or its innermost rate to be de-evaluated for at least 2 years (this decisive factor leads to a two years delay of any additional attainment, so that an improvement of the Euro zone is not possible before the year 2006, and improbable before the year 2007). Budgetary balance budget and a debt criterion): national budget shortfalls are not permissible to go beyond 3 per cent comparative to GDP and the overall lack of debts is not tolerable to surpass 60 per cent comparative to GDP, even though these duties are declining continually11. The first 3 of these criteria have proven to be and are particularly significant during the accession progression to the â €Å"monetary union†, the fourth is additionally important for assessment of the existing EMU. While on or after accession on the first 3 criteria are not in national capability, but mainly in the accountability of the â€Å"European Central Bank† (ECB), the responsibility for the 4th relics with the national governments. This has raised an eyebrow amongst many scholars on whether a common policy is a possibility in an area where there are differing fiscal policies12. Precisely due to the reason that the member states remain committed, it is not enough to have self control which is interdependent and the European Union has to do the monitoring and the controlling of the processes. Economic point of view The method of thinking following the SGP represented from unswervingly from the assumption of optimum legal tender sections (which in actual fact is there or thereabouts a theory of â€Å"in service† currency regions). At the center of this theory (in whatever alt ernative) 2 â€Å"influences† are analyzed: the influence of economic directness within the individual area and the influence of economic union13. Both powers act in favor of â€Å"monetary union: the more open countries are (the more they trade Relative† to the GDP), the more they are damaged economically by exchange rate changes and consequently it makes logic to bring in a single currency (in addition to due to the cost cutting effect of trade facilitation by the regular currency); the more there is economic union between countries, the reduced amount of likely non-symmetric shocks are and the less likely it is essential or even makes logic to accurate for shocks by means of the available exchange rate changes14. The Convergence Criteria are unswervingly drawn from this examination, particularly from the convergence account and to a third significant account: to provide self-assurance in the monetary union. All tangible goals that are to be reached (the slim inflati on, rates of interest, and exchange rates corridors, and the existing numbers in lieu of budgetary discipline) in actual fact have been brought in to promote economic union before – and optimistically during the monetary union (MU) at the individual rate and level15. This is particularly true for the criterion measuring price increases, because large price increases and differences between the member countries put demands on the set exchange rates and for that reason these countries cannot outline a most favorable currency region (and might also have troubles in forming an operating currency region). This is measured by the inflation rate decisive factor in the diminutive run, at the same time as the interest rate decisive factor has been set up to compute inflation prospects in the long run16. The exchange rate measures has been put into practice to integrated marketplace forces into the scheme as some variety of routine stabilizers and as scheming forces. If the marketplace believes that union will be sustainable to a sufficient amount, then the exchange rate will not be critically re-valued by the marketplace. Also the budgetary criterion is due to putting weight on the states so as to guarantee this important sustainability. Large shortfalls may lead to price increases in the average run and a far above the ground debt ratio hence means that more hazard of budget deficit in the long run. As a final point, to extend confidence in this joint self commitment of all affiliate countries, the supporting obligations have been subjected to a code. This makes it potential to take lawful actions at the â€Å"European Court of Justice† (Court) to elucidate, who has dishonored the treaty17. One may justifiably doubt if this attentiveness on the â€Å"convergence account† and the particular focus on the â€Å"self-assurance account† are sufficient to ensure the changeover of the associates of the ‘monetary union† into a most favo rable currency region (or at least an operating currency area). Some extra as well significant forces have considered: from the economist’s opinion especially labor markets and wage suppleness, from the politician’s standpoint particularly centralization of observation, and authorizing power. The stability and growth pact institution The SGP is a structure of rules about the association between states within a group of people to provide global public merchandise like economic stability and also growth18. These â€Å"merchandise† are â€Å"globally public† due to the significance of â€Å"stability and growth† contained by an area which is economically extremely mutually dependent and owing to the reality that countries can take pleasure in the reimbursement from â€Å"stability and growth† without paying the cost. Growth in particular pertaining to the leading economies in the union leads due to the widespread marketplace and to trade put in to effect the effects to expansion in the EU as a sum total and to more augmentation in all of its associate countries, and monetary steadiness leads to extra predictability of the monetary surroundings and for that reason reduces threats and costs for all the members19. Furthermore the SGP is a multifaceted organization, because it is entrenched into the institutional structure of the European Union in a multi-layer organization. It can be analyzed as an economic organization in this logic either with regard to its tangible rules (for example the information used for the union criteria) at the height of â€Å"supremacy† or with revere to its overall structure (for example what competencies what a particular body has) at the height of â€Å"surroundings†20. The following argument will be centered on the competencies with only a few considerations with reference to the previous criteria, although a tangible history of only faintly more than ten years is not exceptionall y long for an â€Å"environmentally oriented† institutional organization to develop fully. This associates that the procedure of potential transformation of the SGP is quite sluggish, and that this procedure is centered on the splitting up of competencies between associate countries, the Commission, and lastly the Council. Furthermore the study is entirely focused on general necessities and regulations (e.g. â€Å"we need convergence criteria†); not on existing measures (e.g. â€Å"what criteria should be implemented†)21. This also entails, that the study is educational in the logic, that the recent communal discussion in relation to the SGP is not very much reproduced in it, for the reason that this discussion is focused on punctual modification of the agreement (which seems not to be very effective, predominantly in the middle and extended run), and not on legitimate questions similar to anchoring the SGP in a novel European constitution and also on how (which happens to be extremely significant for the future of EMU)22. The inquiry to be responded is, if there is equilibrium of players and a stability of power included in the SGP that will show the way the economic procedure to the outcome desired. Connection of the SGP to the political system of the European Union The SGP in its current design features three more troubles, directly associated to the political organization of the Union: the equilibrium of actors and consequently the equilibrium of power are not made certain; the means of alteration are indistinct; and each and every one if this leads to the truthful unfeasibility of sanction. The three pertinent actors for the SGP are the Council, Commission, and lastly the associate state(s). The association between these players is not very obvious, which has shown the way to a grievance by the Commission at the â€Å"Court† against the â€Å"non action† of the Council in the case of countries like Germany and France in the autumn of 2003. In the month of July 2004 the Court affirmed this as an infringement of the pact, which to some extent changed the equilibrium of power in favor of the â€Å"guardian of the treaties†23. Until in recent times the Commission was having a serious shortfall in pressure compared to the associates states, since the final choice concerning an â€Å"excessive deficit procedure† and concerning sanction was politically motivated, to be decided on – by competent majority in the Council. Therefore, the associates, in particular the big ones which include France, Germany, and Italy, in actual fact were capable to triumph over any stern restriction on the budgetary guidelines, on condition that at least there was a hazard that adequate other countries may have comparable problems in close proximity to the future. It has been demonstrated by some researchers in advance of the EMU that this is a vital problem related to the SGP, for the reason that in actua l fact there was never be severe consequences for the countries which were violating the agreement. This was viewed to be a specific risk for confidence in the steadiness of the monetary merger. Although not sufficient time has passed over to confirm this thesis in an empirical manner, the proof seems to be fairly clear and confirming. On the other hand, at the moment the Court has elucidated that the main Council and also the associate states are also closely connected by the SGP. But still after this pronouncement the query remains opened, if the Court will be capable to really consign the Council and the associate states. In actual fact the Court does not have real sanctioning authority. The Court still made clear that the Council on one side does not have the right to stop the extreme deficit procedures entirely, but at the other face has the right to setback the procedure owing to reasons particular probably impromptu by this organization. Thus also the way of change of the tre aty is very much connected to this issue of power. This is one significant reason why no more than negligible alterations of the pact came about during the debate about the Convention24. These transformations do not correct for authority imbalance and do not describe the relationship amid the Council, the Commission, the Supreme Court, and the associate countries more clearly, but they are slight ones nurturing the flexibility of the accord: deliberation of the business phase and of augmentation and employment consequences, and also the recommendations found in several fields25. Fiscal rules rationale Fiscal regulations in a monetary merger can serve up a double purpose; that of fostering the acceptance of time dependable fiscal policy within states and improving the policy harmonization between the countries concerned. Drawing some parallel with the monetary strategy, an effectual way to show aggression on the politically persuaded shortfall bias and a main obstruction to the mediu m and the long term fiscal restraint in many states is from end to end a rules based fiscal structure that holds back the prudence of policy makers and promotes the adoption of plausible, time consistent policy. Moreover, rules are capable of playing a crucial responsibility in coordinating the fiscal policies athwart different controls, especially by plummeting detrimental spill-over. The architects of the EMU were predominantly mindful of the supra-national measurement26. Under unchecked caution, the political communications can encourage time-inconsistent policies, which may include a fiscal debit bias. The most advantageous fiscal policy is recurrently viewed all the way through the prism of inter-temporal tax even, with the current net present value of expenditure equivalent to the net present value of the revenues. With this probably being the case, the budget is upheld in structural equilibrium but deficits can be able to arise from the liberated play of routine stabilizers. However, such a strategy might not be followed by policymakers for a variety of the reasons relating to the political structural design. Alesina and Perotti (31) said persuasively that the conflicting fiscal results across industrialized countries, chiefly in the 1970s and also in the 1980s, could not be put in plain words by the prevailing economic hypothesis absent from any political and economy issues27. The literature gives you an idea about that a plethora of inter-related aspects like fragmented regimes, a high quantity of high spending ministers acting autonomously, relative electoral systems, electoral vagueness, and short government durations, can all proceed to make sub-optimal, time inconsistent fiscal guiding principles (Roubini and Sachs, 1989; Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini, 1991; Kontopoulos and Perotti, 74; Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno, 613)28. Before the coming on of the Maastricht treaty, the results of unconstrained caution manifested themselves thro ughout various structures of time inconsistent policies. For the most part, many countries had persistent and indefensible deficits that fed in the course of the rapid public arrears accretion, countries like Belgium, and Greece saw their arrears spiraling higher than 100 percent of the GDP for the duration of the 1980s or in the early hours of 1990s with deficits suspended around 10 percent of the GDP in countless years. Secondly, most EU states ran highly pro-cyclical fiscal courses of action, particularly during high-quality times (Jaeger, 20). This also leant to be more probable under alliance governments (Skilling, 29) and wherever political powers were dispersed (Lane, 2665)29. Thirdly, most governments in most of the countries tended to create long term welfare states assurances with slight concentration to how it was possible to pay for them, foremost to the accretion of large implied liabilities (Alesina and Perotti, 24). In addition to this, electoral deliberations affecte d proposed fiscal policy outcomes across all of the European democracies (Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen 213). Spillovers on or after lax fiscal policies in a monetary merger created their own common pool difficulty, justifying region wide fiscal regulations. The aptitude to pass on in any case some of the costs of extravagant fiscal policies to other associates can worsen the common pool trouble and intensify the tendency in the direction of time inconsistent policies in any monetary amalgamation. In the euro region, the most commonly raised issues include: A country that is running into fiscal some intricacies could be bailed out by some other countries or probably by the ECB obtaining its debt. Although prohibited by the â€Å"Maastricht treaty†, many of the observers deem that this pathway would be selected to stave off a crisis in the banking system. The probability of such a rescue leads to ethical hazard problem30. Price constancy could be put at risk as the ECB incurs pr essure from extravagant states to lower the interest rates and also to be able to inflate the debt away. Any announced price rises targets could consequently lack trustworthiness, leading to an inflation preconceived notion (Kydland and Prescott, 481; Barro and Gordon, 591). This defeat of credibility might manifest itself throughout the depreciation of the euro, even though some policy in the counterpart countries obviously also plays a role in such a circumstance31. Expansionary fiscal strategy in one country may perhaps add to area-wide interest rate. Domestic policy makers fell short to take into consideration the feel of the local fiscal policy on the other countries in the region. The relation between local fiscal plan and interest rates is hence loosened32. Procedure for excessive deficit A deficit superior than 3 percent of the GDP will trigger the EDP on condition that the surplus is not well thought-out to be outstanding, provisional, and close to the allusion value. This decisive factor is also content if the shortfall has declined considerably and incessantly and comes close up to 3 percent of the GDP. A comparable caveat for the arrears ratio is still looser: in this realm, all that requirements to come to pass is for the proportion to be approaching the 60% of the GDP threshold at a reasonable pace. When putting in order its original report below the EDP, the Commission takes into consideration as to whether the shortfall exceeds administration investment and at the same time considers â€Å"all other relevant factors, including the medium term economic and budgetary position of the member state†33. Exceptional conditions An exception is characterized to have stemmed from â€Å"an occasion externalized from the command of the associate states†¦ which has a most important consequence on the financial situation of the common government, or when ensuing from a harsh economic slump†. In such a case like this one case, a stern econo mic slump is defined as a plunge in actual GDP by at least 2%. A drop between 0.75 and 2% may perhaps be exceptional, given the supporting confirmation. It is usually not the same case when it is less than o.75%. The shortfall is termed to be provisional if it will â€Å"fall under the value which is used for reference subsequent to the end of the odd event or the harsh economic slump†. The SGP is not known to define the nearness principle. All the three must be relevant for this run away clause to be made use of34. First stage: in three months after the coverage date, the ECOFIN Council comes to a decision whether an extreme deficit possibly exists. If that is the case, it will right away issue a suggestion giving: four months to obtain â€Å"effective accomplishment† and; A time limit for the elimination of the unnecessary deficit, which is characteristically the year that follows its classification, therefore barring the special circumstances. Second stage: After a period of four months, on condition that the ECOFIN Council thinks that the associate states is not putting into practice the measures, or that they are insufficient, or that information indicates that the disproportionate shortfall will not be approved within the instance limits which are specified, it will budge on to the subsequent step. If the state is deemed as to have taken some effective act, the modus operandi is positioned in abeyance35. Otherwise, in one month, the Council goes ahead and gives notice for the associate states to take, in a specified instant limit, the measures required to reduce the shortfall. This phase is only appropriate to countries in the concluding stage of the EMU. The Council might request the associate state to present regular reports to keep an eye on the adjustment efforts which are under the enhanced fiscal observation. Final stage: If the associate state is in conformity with the given notice, the course of action is detained in abeyance. If this is not the case, the ECOFIN Council moves to the sanctions stage surrounded in two months. By this schedule, sanctions are able to be imposed in ten months of the coverage date. A non interest incurring deposit will hence be requisite. The first phase of the deposit includes a fixed constituent of 0.2% of GDP and a changeable component equivalent to 1/10 of the difference amid the deficit and the 3%, in percent of the GDP. Each subsequent year, the Council might decide to strengthen the sanctions by having need of one more deposit (variable constituent only). No solitary deposit can go beyond 0.5% of the GDP. If the extreme deficit has not been approved two years subsequent to the time that the deposit was completed, it shall be transformed into a fine. If, prior to a time when two years are up, the lead Council thinks about the excessive shortfall to be corrected, it consequently abrogates the modus operandi and precedes the deposit. Fines are however not reimbursed. Interests on deposits, and the fines, shall also be distributed amongst member countries without too much deficits (Schwartz, 9). Criteria for good fiscal rule The SGP is required to be judged along two equivalent dimensions; first, does it promote the adoption of time consistent strategies, remedying shortfall biases? Secondly, is there an advantage in having a supra-national law at all? The answer to both these questions is definitely a yes, despite a variety of enforcement impenetrability36. As a rule based structure, the SGP is well suitable to addressing the shortfall bias in the fiscal policy. As with monetary strategy, time consistent procedures can be attained by fastening the hands of the policymakers, by having nothing to do with unconstrained judgment, and by taking on a rule based structure. In a lot of ways, the framework for organizing fiscal policies of the EU countries shows the characteristics of a replica fiscal regulation and is generally suitable in the circumstance of th e economic union (Kopits and Symansky, 97). It is elegant, insofar as it remains simple, and also clearly defined, and crystal clear, particularly with respect to the parts that relay to unpleasant policy mistakes37. Also, the description of gross policy faults (deficits exceeding 3 percent of GDP) is sufficient regarding the goal of upholding stability in the economic union. Absent policies to correct the fiscal pressure correlated to aging, the monetary policy might face some major difficulties above the longer run. In addition, persistent breach of the 3 percent limit can destabilize the merger over the average run. In addition, the SGP doles out as a practical external promise technology, which is particularly valuable in nations with histories of macro-economic or even fiscal unpredictability, or politically induced shortfall biases. However, onlookers have raised issues over whether the structure is sufficiently flexible and also enforceable and also as to whether it allows fo r enough ownership. Critics have said that the EDP mechanism is too dull and perfunctory. Also, the â€Å"preventive arm† is seen as deteriorating to take country precise sustainability issues into account adequately, calling like in CBS in all affected countries in spite of the circumstances38. Mostly, on the other hand, this disapproval fails to provide due credence to the necessitation for any regulation to be straightforward and crystal clear, chiefly if it is supranational (Schuknecht, 48). Others have strained attention to shortages in the enforcement apparatus as the principal gap in the SGP’s protective covering (Buti, Eijffinger, and Franco, 20). Inman (1999) claims that at the same time as the EU fiscal structure is effective, it trips up on the enforcement that happens to be partisan rather than sovereign, and resulting from the peer-driven nature it has39. Enforcement harms tend to be connected to possession, as several have argued that SGP is too concentra ted and not adequately respectful of the subsidiary (DeGrauwe, 112). Criticisms General disapproval of the SGP is mostly about its pro-cyclical nature, the very weak consequences on the growth and also the employment and the possibility of exploitation, its universal incredibility, and the real criteria are approximately completely random. â€Å"Handling† of reported data happens for the duration of the configuration process of the monetary unification and it was expected that it will be probable to rule it out in the course of the yearly convergence and constancy reports. This leads to the extremely weak impacts on growth that are mostly due the reasons that are outlined a while before. Neither the pro cyclical quality of the agreement nor the disregard of public investment does assist economic expansion. Even supplementary, the whole agreement seems to hold only development effects that are constructed completely on prospects about the â€Å"spill-over-effects† and t he favorable market behavior. If the common legal tender will be commenced, than optimistic trade effects will take place, fostering invention and consequently leading to development. Nothing is given to ensure this. If the monetary unification is believable than the self-confidence of the economic players will be made stronger, lowering indecision, improving prospect, fostering ventures, and consequently leading to development. Nothing is made available to ensure this (Brunila, 58). If there is financial convergence prior to the monetary union, then the convergence will be also being sustainable and also later afterwards. Almost not anything is provided to make sure this, besides the yearly reports of associate countries, the harmonization of financial and economic politics, and a payable to political cause already strained. Especially a blend of low price rises’ rates and an impartial budget might even lead to deflation forces and consequently may decrease actual developmen t rates, dropping over to the other part of the EU (particularly if occurring in a big country)40. This shows the way to some concluding remarks about centralization, the prominent voting authority, and the sanctions. If the budgetary restraint is taken critically as a necessary component of the monetary union to keep away from the bailing out of â€Å"sluttish† associates, then more efficient management is needed (Bishop, 300). Political decisions build the possibility to define â€Å"exceptional circumstances† that permit for a divergence from the SGP in each single case on a country to country foundation. This has some advantages as well as some disadvantages. Particularly the disadvantages could be abridged by a centralization of a checking and the voting competences in the supra-national body which is like a commission, while an intergovernmental body (similar to the Council) could create suggestions if and what â€Å"Unique circumstances† exists that give good reason for a divergence from the SGP. Another answer might be the reweighting of the appointment authority in the Council for SGP based decisions in accordance to the budgetary regulation of the associates: the voting authority of affiliates with a fair budget or a budget excess should be enhanced, at the same time as the voting influence of members infringing the deficit measure is supposed to be reduced (Artis, 89). One might also put forward stripping affiliates that breach the pact of their voting control completely or to initiate a similar practice according to the price rises standards41. 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Basingstoke: Palgrave. 2001. DeGrauwe, Paul.Economics of Monetary Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press.2001 Hule, Richard and Matthias Sutter: â€Å"Can the Stability and Growth Pact in EMU Cause Budget Deficit Cycles?† in: Empirica 30 (1), pp. 25-38. Inman, Robert. P. â€Å"Do Balanced Budget Rules Work? U.S. Experience and PossibleLessons for the EMU,† NB ER Working Paper No. 5838 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research).1996 Jaeger, Albert â€Å"Cyclical Fiscal Policy Behavior in EU Countries,† IMF Staff Country Report No. 01/201 (Washington: International Monetary Fund). 2001. Kontopoulos, Yianos, and Roberto Perotti, â€Å"Government Fragmentation and Fiscal Policy Outcomes: Evidence from OECD Countries,† Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, ed. by James Poterba and Jurgen von Hagen (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press). 1999. Kopits, George, and Steven Symansky, â€Å"Fiscal Policy Rules,† IMF Occasional Paper No. 162 (Washington: International Monetary Fund). 1998. Kydland, Finn, and Edward Prescott, â€Å"Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans,† Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 85, No. 3, pp. 473-92. Lane, Philip R., â€Å"The Cyclical Behavior of Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the OECD,† Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 87, pp. 2661-675. Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria, Roberto Perotti, and Massimo Rostagno, 2002, â€Å"Electoral Systems and Public Spending,† Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 117, No. 4, pp. 607-57. Schuknecht, Ludger, â€Å"EU Fiscal Rules: Issues and Lessons from Political Economy,† European Central Bank Working Paper, No. 421 (Frankfurt: European Central Bank). 2003. Schwartz, Anna J. â€Å"Risks to the Long-Term Stability of the Euro†, in: Atlantic Economic Journal 32 (1), pp. 1-10 Skilling, David, â€Å"The Political Economy of Public Debt Accumulation in OECD Countries Since 1960,† mimeo, New Zealand Treasury. 2000. Williamson, Oliver E.â€Å"The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead.† in: Journal of Economic Literature 38 (3), pp. 595-613. 2000 Footnotes 1 Williamson, Oliver E.â€Å"The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead.† in: Journal of Economic Literature 38 (3), pp. 595-613. 2000 2 Kopits, Georg e, and Steven Symansky, â€Å"Fiscal Policy Rules,† IMF Occasional Paper No. 162 (Washington: International Monetary Fund). 1998. 3 Lane, Philip R., â€Å"The Cyclical Behavior of Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the OECD,† Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 87, pp. 2661-675. 4 Jaeger, Albert â€Å"Cyclical Fiscal Policy Behavior in EU Countries,† IMF Staff Country Report No. 01/201 (Washington: International Monetary Fund). 2001. 5 Hule, Richard and Matthias Sutter: â€Å"Can the Stability and Growth Pact in EMU Cause Budget Deficit Cycles?† in: Empirica 30 (1), pp. 25-38. 6 Hule, Richard and Matthias Sutter: â€Å"Can the Stability and Growth Pact in EMU Cause Budget Deficit Cycles?† in: Empirica 30 (1), pp. 25-38. 7 Lane, Philip R., â€Å"The Cyclical Behavior of Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the OECD,† Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 87, pp. 2661-675. 8 Schwartz, Anna J. â€Å"Risks to the Long-Term Stability of the Euro†, in: Atlanti c Economic Journal 32 (1), pp. 1-10 9 Skilling, David, â€Å"The Political Economy of Public Debt Accumulation in OECD Countries Since 1960,† mimeo, New Zealand Treasury. 2000. 10 Skilling, David, â€Å"The Political Economy of Public Debt Accumulation in OECD Countries Since 1960,† mimeo, New Zealand Treasury. 2000. 11 Artis, Michael J. The Economics of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press.2001. 12 Bishop, Graham â€Å"The Future of the Stability and Growth Pact†, in: International Finance 6 (2), pp. 297-308. 13 Artis, Michael J. The Economics of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press.2001. 14 Artis, Michael J. The Economics of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press.2001. 15 Alesina, Alberto, Nouriel Roubini, and Gerald Cohen. Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1999. 16 Alesina, Alberto and Roberto Perotti. â€Å"The Political Economy of Budget Deficits,† Staff Papers, Inte rnational Monetary Fund, Vol. 42, No.1, pp. 1-31. 17 Williamson, Oliver E.â€Å"The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead.† in: Journal of Economic Literature 38 (3), pp. 595-613. 2000 18 Williamson, Oliver E.â€Å"The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead.† in: Journal of Economic Literature 38 (3), pp. 595-613. 2000 19 Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria, Roberto Perotti, and Massimo Rostagno, 2002, â€Å"Electoral Systems and Public Spending,† Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 117, No. 4, pp. 607-57. 20 Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria, Roberto Perotti, and Massimo Rostagno, 2002, â€Å"Electoral Systems and Public Spending,† Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 117, No. 4, pp. 607-57. 21 Kopits, George, and Steven Symansky, â€Å"Fiscal Policy Rules,† IMF Occasional Paper No. 162 (Washington: International Monetary Fund). 1998. 22 Kopits, George, and Steven Symansky, â€Å"Fiscal Policy Rules,† IMF Occasional Paper No. 162 (Washington: International Monetary Fund). 1998. 23 Lane, Philip R., â€Å"The Cyclical Behavior of Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the OECD,† Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 87, pp. 2661-675. 24 Kydland, Finn, and Edward Prescott, â€Å"Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans,† Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 85, No. 3, pp. 473-92. 25 Lane, Philip R., â€Å"The Cyclical Behavior of Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the OECD,† Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 87, pp. 2661-675. 26 Kydland, Finn, and Edward Prescott, â€Å"Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans,† Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 85, No. 3, pp. 473-92. 27 Alesina, Alberto and Roberto Perotti. â€Å"The Political Economy of Budget Deficits,† Staff Papers, International Monetary Fund, Vol. 42, No.1, pp. 1-31. 28 Alesina, Alberto and Roberto Perotti. â€Å"The Political Economy of Budget Deficits,† Staff Papers, Inte rnational Monetary Fund, Vol. 42, No.1, pp. 1-31. 29 Lane, Philip R., â€Å"The Cyclical Behavior of Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the OECD,† Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 87, pp. 2661-675. 30 Barro, Robert, and David Gordon, 1983, â€Å"A Positive Theory on Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model,† Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 91, No. 4, pp. 589-610. 31 Kydland, Finn, and Edward Prescott, â€Å"Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans,† Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 85, No. 3, pp. 473-92. 32 Barro, Robert, and David Gordon, 1983, â€Å"A Positive Theory on Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model,† Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 91, No. 4, pp. 589-610. 33 Artis, Michael J. The Economics of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press.2001. 34 Artis, Michael J. The Economics of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press.2001. 35 DeGrauwe, Paul.Economics of Monetary Union. Oxford: Oxford University P ress.2001 36 DeGrauwe, Paul.Economics of Monetary Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press.2001 37 Kopits, George, and Steven Symansky, â€Å"Fiscal Policy Rules,† IMF Occasional Paper No. 162 (Washington: International Monetary Fund). 1998. 38 Schuknecht, Ludger, â€Å"EU Fiscal Rules: Issues and Lessons from Political Economy,† European Central Bank Working Paper, No. 421 (Frankfurt: European Central Bank). 2003. 39 DeGrauwe, Paul.Economics of Monetary Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press.2001 40 Bishop, Graham â€Å"The Future of the Stability and Growth Pact†, in: International Finance 6 (2), pp. 297-308. 41 Artis, Michael J. The Economics of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press.2001. This term paper on Risk assessment for commercial loans was written and submitted by user Marlee Ratliff to help you with your own studies. You are free to use it for research and reference purposes in order to write your own paper; however, you must cite it accordingly. You can donate your paper here.

SAT Historical Percentiles for 2015, 2014, 2013, 2012, and 2011

SAT Historical Percentiles for 2015, 2014, 2013, 2012, and 2011 SAT / ACT Prep Online Guides and Tips If you took the SAT from 2011-2015, you may be wondering what your percentile score is on the SAT. Is a 1500 on the SAT in 2011 the same percentile score as a 1500 in 2015? Do percentile scores change over time? In this article, I will explain SAT percentile scores, how they change, and I'll provide the percentile scores for SAT combined scores and section scores for 2015, 2014, 2013, 2012, and 2011. Note: Go to this article instead if you're looking for historical percentiles for the new SAT (tests taken March 2016 and later). What Are Percentile Scores? Percentile scores reveal how well you did in relation to other people. If you scored in the 99th percentile, then you did better than 99% of the people who took the test. If you scored in the 50th percentile, then you scored higher than 50% of the people who took the test. The College Board determines its percentile scores annually from the scores of college-bound high school seniors who took the SAT. The higher your percentile score, the better you did relative to other high school seniors. Do Percentile Scores Change? Generally, percentile scores for equivalent SAT scores stay the same from year to year. For example, a combined SAT score of 2180 was the 98th percentile in2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015. However, percentile scores for the same combined and section scores can change very slightly. A combined score of 1990 was the 92nd percentile for 2014, but it was the 93rd percentile in 2011-2013 and 2015. Similarly, a score of 630 on Critical Reading was the 86th percentile in 2011, 2013, 2014, and 2015, but it was the 87th percentile in 2012. The SAT does try to utilize its scoring system so that equivalent SAT scores are indicative of the same percentile scores and skill level, regardless of when the test was taken. The purpose of the SAT is to provide a valid way to compare students. A score of 1600 from March 2015 is supposed to be equivalent to a 1600 from April 2015 or April 2007. How Should You Use This Data and Why Is It Important? Your percentile score is the most straightforward way to determine if you got a good or badSAT score. If you scored higher than the majority of test-takers, then you did well. However, when you apply to a specific college, you're being compared to the other students who apply to that school. Most colleges publicize their 25th and 75th percentile SAT scores. If you want to be competitive for admission at a certain college, then your target score should be aroundthe school's 75th percentile score. Also, percentile scores help put your scores in context. There may not seem to be much difference between a 680 on the Critical Reading section and a 600 on Math, but the Critical Reading score is the 94th percentile while the Math score is the 75th (according to 2015 SAT percentiles). Raising each section score by 100 points would raise the Critical Reading percentile ranking by 5 points but the Math by 18. If you're considering retaking the SAT, your percentile scores can help you determine how you should prioritize your time. Similarly, a small composite score increase can have a huge impact on your percentile score if you received a middle score. For example, in 2015, a 1500 was the 52nd percentile but a 1750 was the 78th. Raising your score 250 points can raise your score from average to among the top 1/4 of test-takers. Finally, seeing the percentile scores for multiple years shows how little variance there is between percentile scores for the same SAT composite or section score in different years. If you're worried about how an older SAT score stacks up with more recent scores, take a look at these charts to get an idea of how it compares. Composite Score Percentiles, 2015 - 2011 Score 2015 Percentile 2014 Percentile 2013 Percentile 2012 Percentile 2011 Percentile 2400 99+ 99+ 99+ 99+ 99+ 2390 99+ 99+ 99+ 99+ 99+ 2380 99+ 99+ 99+ 99+ 99+ 2370 99+ 99+ 99+ 99+ 99+ 2360 99+ 99+ 99+ 99+ 99+ 2350 99+ 99+ 99+ 99+ 99+ 2340 99+ 99+ 99+ 99+ 99+ 2330 99+ 99+ 99+ 99+ 99+ 2320 99+ 99+ 99+ 99+ 99+ 2310 99+ 99+ 99+ 99+ 99+ 2300 99 99 99+ 99 99+ 2290 99 99 99 99 99+ 2280 99 99 99 99 99 2270 99 99 99 99 99 2260 99 99 99 99 99 2250 99 99 99 99 99 2240 99 99 99 99 99 2230 99 99 99 99 99 2220 99 99 99 99 99 2210 98 98 98 99 99 2200 98 98 98 98 98 2190 98 98 98 98 98 2180 98 98 98 98 98 2170 98 98 98 98 98 2160 98 98 98 98 98 2150 97 97 97 97 98 2140 97 97 97 97 97 2130 97 97 97 97 97 2120 97 97 97 97 97 2110 97 96 97 97 97 2100 96 96 96 96 96 2090 96 96 96 96 96 2080 96 96 96 96 96 2070 95 95 95 96 96 2060 95 95 95 95 95 2050 95 95 95 95 95 2040 94 94 94 95 95 2030 94 94 94 94 94 2020 94 94 94 94 94 2010 93 93 93 93 93 2000 93 93 93 93 93 1990 93 92 93 93 93 1980 92 92 92 92 92 1970 92 92 92 92 92 1960 91 91 91 91 91 1950 91 91 91 91 91 1940 90 90 90 90 90 1930 90 90 90 90 90 1920 89 89 89 89 89 1910 89 89 89 89 89 1900 88 88 88 88 88 1890 88 87 88 88 88 1880 87 87 87 87 87 1870 87 86 86 87 86 1860 86 86 86 86 86 1850 85 85 85 85 85 1840 85 84 84 85 84 1830 84 84 84 84 84 1820 83 83 83 83 83 1810 83 82 82 82 82 1800 82 81 82 82 82 1790 81 81 81 81 81 1780 80 80 80 80 80 1770 80 79 79 79 79 1760 79 78 78 79 78 1750 78 77 78 78 78 1740 77 77 77 77 77 1730 76 76 76 76 76 1720 75 75 75 75 75 1710 74 74 74 74 74 1700 74 73 73 73 73 1690 73 72 72 72 72 1680 72 71 71 71 71 1670 71 70 70 70 70 1660 70 69 69 69 69 1650 69 68 68 68 68 1640 68 67 67 67 67 1630 67 66 66 66 66 1620 66 65 65 65 65 1610 65 64 64 64 64 1600 64 63 63 63 63 1590 62 62 62 62 62 1580 61 61 61 61 61 1570 60 60 60 60 59 1560 59 59 58 59 58 1550 58 57 57 57 57 1540 57 56 56 56 56 1530 56 55 55 55 55 1520 55 54 54 54 53 1510 53 53 52 53 52 1500 52 52 51 51 51 1490 51 50 50 50 50 1480 50 49 49 49 49 1470 49 48 48 48 47 1460 48 47 46 47 46 1450 46 46 45 45 45 1440 45 44 44 44 44 1430 44 43 43 43 42 1420 43 42 42 42 41 1410 42 41 40 40 40 1400 40 40 39 39 39 1390 39 38 38 38 38 1380 38 37 37 37 36 1370 37 36 36 36 35 1360 36 35 34 34 34 1350 34 34 33 33 33 1340 33 32 32 32 32 1330 32 31 31 31 30 1320 31 30 30 30 29 1310 30 29 29 29 28 1300 29 28 27 27 27 1290 28 27 26 26 26 1280 27 26 25 25 25 1270 26 25 24 24 24 1260 25 24 23 23 23 1250 24 23 22 22 22 1240 22 22 21 21 21 1230 22 21 20 20 20 1220 21 20 19 19 19 1210 20 19 18 18 18 1200 19 18 17 17 17 1190 18 17 17 16 16 1180 17 16 16 16 15 1170 16 15 15 15 14 1160 15 14 14 14 14 1150 14 14 13 13 13 1140 14 13 13 12 12 1130 13 12 12 11 11 1120 12 11 11 10 11 1110 12 11 11 10 10 1100 11 10 10 9 9 1090 10 10 9 9 9 1080 10 9 9 9 8 1070 9 8 8 8 8 1060 9 8 8 7 7 1050 8 7 7 7 7 1040 7 7 7 7 6 1030 7 6 6 6 6 1020 7 6 6 6 5 1010 6 6 5 5 5 1000 6 5 5 5 5 990 5 5 5 5 4 980 5 5 4 4 4 970 5 4 4 4 4 960 4 4 4 4 3 950 4 4 3 3 3 940 4 3 3 3 3 930 3 3 3 3 3 920 3 3 3 3 2 910 3 3 3 2 2 900 3 2 2 2 2 890 2 2 2 2 2 880 2 2 2 2 2 870 2 2 2 2 2 860 2 2 2 1 1 850 2 2 1 1 1 840 2 1 1 1 1 830 1 1 1 1 1 820 1 1 1 1 1 810 1 1 1 1 1 800 1 1 1 1 1 790 1 1 1 1 1 780 1 1 1 1 1 770 1 1 1 1- 1- 760 1 1 1- 1- 1- 750 1 1 1- 1- 1- 740 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 730 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 720 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 710 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 700 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 690 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 680 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 670 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 660 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 650 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 640 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 630 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 620 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 610 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 600 Section Score Percentiles Critical Reading Score 2015 Percentile 2014 Percentile 2013 Percentile 2012 Percentile 2011 Percentile 800 99 99 99 99+ 99+ 790 99 99 99 99 99 780 99 99 99 99 99 770 99 99 99 99 99 760 99 99 99 99 99 750 98 98 98 98 98 740 98 98 98 98 98 730 97 97 97 97 97 720 96 97 97 97 97 710 96 96 96 96 96 700 96 95 95 95 95 690 95 94 94 94 94 680 94 93 94 93 93 670 92 92 92 92 92 660 91 91 91 91 91 650 90 90 90 90 90 640 89 88 88 88 88 630 86 86 86 87 86 620 84 84 84 84 84 610 82 82 82 83 82 600 80 80 80 81 80 590 78 77 77 78 78 580 75 75 75 76 75 570 73 72 73 73 73 560 70 70 70 71 70 550 67 66 67 67 67 540 64 64 64 64 64 530 61 60 61 61 60 520 57 57 57 58 58 510 54 54 54 55 54 500 51 50 51 51 51 490 48 47 48 48 47 480 44 44 44 44 44 470 41 40 41 41 40 460 37 37 37 37 37 450 35 34 34 34 34 440 31 31 31 31 30 430 28 27 27 27 27 420 25 25 24 25 24 410 22 21 21 21 21 400 19 19 18 19 18 390 17 16 16 16 16 380 15 14 14 14 14 370 13 12 12 12 11 360 11 10 10 10 10 350 9 9 8 9 8 340 8 7 7 7 7 330 7 6 6 6 6 320 5 5 5 5 5 310 5 4 4 4 4 300 4 4 4 3 3 290 3 3 3 3 3 280 3 3 3 2 2 270 2 2 2 2 2 260 2 2 2 2 2 250 2 2 2 1 1 240 1 1 1 1 1 230 1 1 1 1 1 220 1 1 1 1 1 210 1 1 1 1 1 200 Math Score 2015 Percentile 2014 Percentile 2013 Percentile 2012 Percentile 2011 Percentile 800 99 99 99 99 99 790 99 99 99 99 99 780 99 99 99 98 99 770 98 98 98 98 98 760 97 97 97 97 98 750 97 97 97 97 97 740 96 96 96 96 96 730 95 95 96 96 96 720 95 95 95 95 95 710 94 94 94 94 94 700 93 93 93 93 93 690 92 91 92 92 92 680 90 90 90 90 90 670 89 88 89 89 89 660 87 87 87 87 87 650 86 85 85 85 86 640 84 83 83 83 84 630 82 82 81 82 82 620 80 79 79 80 80 610 77 77 77 78 77 600 75 75 75 74 75 590 73 73 73 72 73 580 71 70 70 70 70 570 68 67 67 67 67 560 66 64 65 64 64 550 62 62 62 62 62 540 59 59 58 58 58 530 56 55 55 55 55 520 53 52 52 52 52 510 50 49 48 49 48 500 46 45 45 45 46 490 44 42 42 42 41 480 41 40 38 39 38 470 37 36 35 35 36 460 34 33 32 32 32 450 31 30 29 29 29 440 28 27 26 26 26 430 25 24 23 23 23 420 22 21 21 21 20 410 19 19 18 18 17 400 17 16 16 16 15 390 15 14 14 13 13 380 13 12 12 11 11 370 11 10 10 10 10 360 9 9 9 8 8 350 8 7 7 7 7 340 7 6 6 6 6 330 6 5 5 5 5 320 5 4 4 4 4 310 4 3 3 3 3 300 3 3 3 2 2 290 2 2 2 2 2 280 2 2 2 2 2 270 1 1 1 1 1 260 1 1 1 1 1 250 1 1 1 1 1 240 1 1 1 1 1 230 1 1 1 1 1 220 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 210 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 200 Writing Score 2015 Percentile 2014 Percentile 2013 Percentile 2012 Percentile 2011 Percentile 800 99+ 99+ 99+ 99+ 99+ 790 99 99 99 99 99 780 99 99 99 99 99 770 99 99 99 99 99 760 99 99 99 99 99 750 98 98 98 98 98 740 98 98 98 98 98 730 98 97 98 98 97 720 97 97 97 97 97 710 96 96 96 96 96 700 96 96 96 96 96 690 95 95 95 95 95 680 94 94 94 94 94 670 93 93 93 93 93 660 92 92 92 92 92 650 91 90 90 90 90 640 89 89 89 89 89 630 88 88 88 88 88 620 86 86 86 86 86 610 84 84 84 84 84 600 82 82 82 82 82 590 80 80 80 80 80 580 78 78 78 78 78 570 76 76 76 75 75 560 74 73 73 73 72 550 71 70 70 70 70 540 68 68 68 67 67 530 65 65 65 64 64 520 62 62 61 61 61 510 59 58 58 58 58 500 56 55 55 55 54 490 53 52 51 52 51 480 49 48 48 48 47 470 46 45 45 44 44 460 42 41 41 41 40 450 39 38 37 38 37 440 35 34 34 34 34 430 32 31 30 31 30 420 29 28 27 27 27 410 25 25 24 24 24 400 22 21 21 21 21 390 19 19 18 18 18 380 17 16 16 16 15 370 14 14 13 13 13 360 12 12 11 11 11 350 10 10 9 9 9 340 8 8 8 8 7 330 7 7 6 6 6 320 6 5 5 5 5 310 5 4 4 4 4 300 4 4 3 3 3 290 3 3 3 3 3 280 3 2 2 2 2 270 2 2 2 2 2 260 2 2 2 1 1 250 2 1 1 1 1 240 1 1 1 1 1 230 1 1 1 1 1 220 1 1 1 1 1 210 1 1 1 1 1- 200 What's Next? Check out these posts on what SAT scores measure and if you need SAT scores to transfer colleges. How do these compare to percentiles on the new SAT? Learn more about new SAT percentile ranks here. Finally, learn how to calculate your SAT score. Want to learn more about the SAT but tired of reading blog articles? Then you'll love our free, SAT prep livestreams. Designed and led by PrepScholar SAT experts, these live video events are a great resource for students and parents looking to learn more about the SAT and SAT prep. Click on the button below to register for one of our livestreams today!

Future Economic Stagnation for Rich Countries Essay

Future Economic Stagnation for Rich Countries - Essay Example This essay demonstrates the huge gap between rich countries and developing countries and provides factors and reasons for possible future economic stagnation for rich countries. There used to be a time when there existed a few rich countries who dominated the world economy and their contribution to the global GDP was around two-third. This means that the rest of the world was under developed and had a falling economy rate. Later, the world faced some crisis which shook the rich countries’ economy and at the same time helped the developing countries to grow at a high pace. This led to the possibility of economic stagnation of the rich countries in near future. In the current scenario, globalization has worked in favor of developing economies. Several developing countries, majorly Asian economies, are growing at such a high pace that the gap between the rich and the developing countries has shortened big time. Reasons of the possible future economic stagnation are: Recent Western Recession, Insufficient Supply and Slow Recovery from Financial Crisis (2008-2009). First recommendations for avoiding future economic stagnationis Improving Short-Term Demand and Efficient Supply. No country can recover from the financial crises in a short time. Second recommendation is Boosting Medium-Term Growth. The third recommendation is Role of Government, that should also put their effort and think more logically regarding the ways of supporting the demand and making better the supply which can in return increase the productivity.